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Abstract 
 
Targeted social media advertising based on 
psychometric user profiling has emerged as an 
effective way of reaching individuals who are 
predisposed to accept and be persuaded by the 
advertising message. In the political realm, the use of 
psychometrics appears to have been used to spread 
both information and misinformation through social 
media in recent elections in the U.S. and Europe, 
partially resulting in the current, public debate about 
‘fake news’. This paper questions the ethics of these 
methods, both in a commercial context and in the 
context of democratic processes. The ethical approach 
is based on the theoretical, contractarian work of John 
Rawls which serves as a lens through which the author 
examines whether the rights of citizens, as Rawls 
attributes them, are violated by this practice. The 
paper concludes that within a Rawlsian framework, 
use of psychometrics in commercial advertising on 
social media platforms is not necessarily unethical, 
since the user enters freely into a contract that allows 
for psychometrics to be used, and because this type of 
advertising is not necessary for full participation in 
society. The opposite is the case for political 
information, and thus, the paper concludes that use of 
psychometrics in political campaigning violates 
several of Rawls’ ethical maxims.  
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Analysis of a social media user’s behavior through 
collection of data is now a common practice, and has 
been subject to both criticism and scholarly inquiry for 
many years. The construction of a social profile on a 
user is one of the main monetization tools for providers 
of social media services and the tools of this trade are 
constantly evolving [1],[2]. Recently, some attention 
has been paid to the concept of psychometrics and their 
utility in predicting personal traits  of social media 
users to subsequently predict their behavior when 
exposed to hyper-targeted advertising [3],[4]. The 
psychometric trend has spilled over from advertising 
and marketing into other realms of strategic social 
media persuasion, most notably politics. 
As this type of hypertargeting moves from the 
commercial sphere into the sphere of public discourse 
and democratic processes, it may be prudent to begin 
interrogating the ethics of the methods being used. The 
question is whether there is an ethical difference 
between collecting data and conducting psychometric 
analysis with the purpose of persuading receivers of 
advertisements versus persuading voter groups. 
Though it can be argued that both situations have a 
similar, asymmetrical power balance, there are 
contextual differences that separate the two types of 
persuasion scenarios, and this may prove to have 
consequences for the normative evaluation of the 
methods on a societal level. Persuasion tactics in 
elections are part of the democratic process itself and 
for this reason, it can be argued, they deserve a higher 
level of normative scrutiny, particularly since a 
substantial part of the literature in moral and political 
philosophy is dedicated to the construction of a just 
society and fairness in democratic processes.  
In this paper, I will use the work and positions of 
one of the foremost thinkers to have ventured into the 
normativity of democratic processes in the modern era, 
John Rawls, to interrogate the ethics of using 
psychometrics as part of a strategy to impact voter 
groups, whether this is in an election or e.g. as part of 
an information warfare tactic. Rather than embark on 
mission similar to the impressive work done by 
Robinson [2] on a Rawlsian approach to data mining in 
general, I have chosen to focus on this particular 
method of data collection and analysis, as I believe it in 
itself carries some very interesting ethical dilemmas.  
From the starting point of an overview of the use, 
norms and ethics of psychometrics in the commercial 
social media sphere, I will follow the trajectory of 
psychometric persuasion tactics into democratic 
processes and cast a light on some problematic issues 
that arise from this transition. 
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2. Psychometrics for advertising on 
common social media platforms. 
 
Psychometrics, understood broadly as personality 
traits and behaviors that can be evaluated/measured 
and scored for different purposes, is a field with a long 
history that can be traced all the way back to Darwin 
[5]. 
While there are some standard psychometric 
models (more on this later), oftentimes social media 
platforms will create their own metrics to build the 
social profile needed to increase the accuracy of 
targeted advertising. The latter term is used in this 
paper to describe advertising and marketing efforts in 
varying expressive forms that attempt to address the 
needs of the individual as directly as possible. Several 
studies have shown the high efficacy of targeted 
advertising [6],[7],[8],[9] and the economy that has 
emerged around targeted advertising also shows that 
advertisers at least have a perception that it is effective.  
Psychometrics are really a dimension of micro-
segmentation, a marketing concept in which advertisers 
are able to divide the population into small segments 
with comparable personality traits and preferences. By 
doing so, it is possible to more narrowly advertise to a 
specific group rather than to a mass audience, which is 
usually more expensive [10]. Traditionally, advertising 
cost prices have been determined by the amount of 
exposure the advertising medium yields, i.e. how many 
people watch a tv ad or pass by a billboard. With 
micro-segmentation, advertisers can ignore all those 
who have no interest in the product being advertised, 
and instead push to persuade those who are already 
inclined to listen [11].  
Psychometrics can be viewed as a tool that places 
individuals into micro-segments. By attributing certain 
traits and behaviors to an individual, social media 
platforms can build a so-called “social profile” on a 
user, bundle users from a certain segment together and 
offer advertisers an audience that is already interested 
in the product they want to sell [1].   
Facebook’s use of psychometrics for advertising 
purposes has been revealed by journalists [12] and 
even by one of its own former program managers, who 
helped construct the psychometric system on the 
world’s largest social media platform. In fact, while 
describing a (since abandoned) tool constructed by the 
Facebook data team which used data to recommend 
Facebook Pages to users, Garcia-Martinez [13] asks a 
question that is perfectly relevant to the discussion in 
this paper. The algorithm of the tool in question would 
start “..spitting out…Every ethnic stereotype you can 
imagine”. As Noble [14], Srinivasan [15] and many 
others have shown, this type of bias often occurs in 
algorithms considered transparent by their makers, 
leading to the current wave of algorithmic critique in 
information and communications studies as well as 
related fields. Garcia-Martinez’ data-centric approach 
leads him to state that “Sometimes data behaves 
unethically” which shifts the normative gaze from the 
interpretation of data to the data itself. Assigning 
agency to data in this manner is problematic, but this 
related discussion will have to be dealt with in a 
separate paper. It is Garcia-Martinez’ following 
question that is of relevance to the present discussion: 
“African Americans living in postal codes with 
depressed incomes likely do respond 
disproportionately to ads for usurious “payday” loans. 
Hispanics between the ages of 18 and 25 probably do 
engage with ads singing the charms and advantages of 
military service. Why should those examples of 
targeting be viewed as any less ethical than, say, ads 
selling $100 Lululemon yoga pants targeting 
thirtysomething women in affluent postal codes like 
San Francisco’s Marina district?” [13, 13th para.] 
One response to this question might be: “Because 
there is such a thing as marketing ethics”. Murphy [16] 
provides an excellent overview of the many decades of 
work building ethical frameworks for marketing. The 
ethical discussion within marketing is almost a 
reflection of the ethics field itself, with the tools and 
conditions of the marketing sphere being considered 
through the lenses of the main schools of ethics and 
moral philosophy. 
One of these, pertinent to this paper, is the 
deontological, contract-based theories of John Rawls. 
Several scholars have applied Rawls’ work to business 
and marketing [17],[18],[19]. In particular, Freeman 
[20] expands Rawls’ conception of a fair contract to 
business contracts. Freeman writes that a contract is 
only fair, “if the parties to the contract would agree to 
it in ignorance of their actual stakes”, echoing Rawls’ 
“veil of ignorance” concept [21], through which one 
must consider the conditions of a social contract if 
fairness is to be achieved. 
This raises the question: Is the contract that e.g. 
Facebook enters into with the user a fair one? There is 
no need to consider a conceptual contract here, a very 
real one comes into existence, every time a user 
registers with Facebook and accepts the terms and 
conditions of using the service. The ethics of these 
end-user license agreements and similar texts have 
been discussed elsewhere, particularly in light of the 
privacy concerns they give rise to [3],[10]. Most 
scholars agree on one point: Though the pervasiveness 
of social media may apply pressure on the individual to 
engage with them or become a social outcast [22],[23], 
the decision still rests with the individual. It is the 
decision and responsibility of the individual user to 
accept or decline the conditions under which the user 
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partakes in the services offered by social media 
companies. The cost/benefit analysis of what a user 
gets in return for giving away personal information and 
agreeing to become exposed to targeted advertising is 
important, but irrelevant in this paper.  
Based on Freeman’s use of Rawls above, one can 
argue that entering into a contract with a social media 
company like the one referenced here is an unfair 
proposition. The problem is that this argument hinges 
on what the needs of the individual are. Where Rawls 
argues for fair social contracts in a society that it is 
difficult for individuals to abandon, it is entirely 
possible to avoid using social media (at least until the 
time of writing). Unlike basic Internet access or 
ownership of a cell phone, which Schroeder and Ling 
[24] likens to a Durkheimian social fact, we have not 
yet arrived at a point where engagements with social 
media platforms are necessary to function as a citizen 
in society. You don’t need to be on Twitter to pay your 
taxes or need an Instagram account to vote. And not 
having a Facebook account may in fact be beneficial 
when you apply for some types of jobs. 
Thus, when commercial social media platforms use 
psychometrics for advertising, it is something the user 
accepts freely when entering into the contract with that 
platform. There may be ethical issues related to the 
platform changing the conditions without alerting the 
user, not upholding their part of the contract, selling 
psychometric data to third parties without informing 
the user or not making it clear that psychometric 
profiling is taking place. But if all users enter into the 
contract fully informed about the nature of the 
relationship between social media platform and the 
individual user, Rawls provides no basis for the 
argument that the use of psychometrics is unethical for 
commercial purposes. 
 
3. Psychometrics in political 
persuasion on social media 
 
When it comes to using psychometrics in social 
media as persuasive tactics for political or strategic 
purposes, conditions are different, and there are other 
ethical concerns at play. As mentioned above, it is 
entirely possible to be a citizen in society without 
engaging with social media – at least in most Western 
countries at the time of writing. But it is substantially 
more difficult to disengage from society altogether. 
When we discuss Rawlsian, deontological ethics, we 
do so within the frame of a society being constructed 
with fairness as a guiding principle. Although 
philosophers from Aristotle to Heidegger point to 
ethics that exist regardless of the interactions of 
humans [25], the type of deontological ethics discussed 
in this paper are related to behaviors in which humans 
have some sort of impact on each other, on animals and 
on the environment. When discussing whether the use 
of psychometrics in social media can be ethical, it is 
pointless to consider the singular individual outside 
society, since both psychometrics and social media are 
contingent on interactions of humans. I shall therefore, 
going forward in the discussion, disregard any 
hypothetical situation in which society does not exist, 
or where the individual can abandon society with ease. 
Upon the acceptance of the existence of a society in 
which psychometrics can be used in social media, the 
Rawlsian question then becomes: Is it fair to use 
psychometrics in social media, given that we strive for 
a just society? Can a society that holds fairness as a 
guiding principle allow for the use of psychometrics in 
social media when the intent is political? 
Rawls is quite clear on this point. For a society to 
be just, it must be “well-ordered” [26, pp. 8]. This 
means that the basic principles governing individuals 
and society, chosen by those who constructed the 
society, must be transparent to the citizen. The 
mechanisms of the system of governance must be clear 
to the citizen, and citizens must be able to participate in 
these mechanisms. This does not mean, e.g. that law 
enforcement in society must be completely transparent 
and nothing can be classified. But it does mean that 
citizens must find transparency in the mechanisms 
through which something is kept secret from them, and 
must agree that this ability should be given to law 
enforcement. [26]. 
In other words, Rawls argues that in a just and fair 
society, citizens must be able to monitor the 
mechanisms of democracy to ensure that society stays 
“well-ordered”, and they must have access to the 
information needed to do so. Here, we hit upon the first 
challenge when it comes to the use of psychometrics in 
social media in situations of political persuasion. I 
argue that the precise targeting of information delivery 
may isolate the citizen from other information sources, 
if the volume of the information delivered through 
targeting is so high that it effectively drowns out other 
sources.  
 
3.1. The case of Michigan in the 2016 U.S. 
presidential election 
 
During the 2016 presidential election campaign in 
the U.S., the state of Michigan was key to Donald 
Trump’s victory. It was also one of the states where 
Trump’s victory was smallest, with only a 0.2% 
voteshare advantage over his opponent, Hillary 
Clinton. It seems fair to assume that with such a small 
margin, the breadth of events that could have 
contributed to the result taking one direction or the 
other is substantial. In the jigsaw puzzle of variables 
Page 1724
that caused Trump to gain this small advantage, it 
would likely not take the removal or reversal of more 
than a few variables for the advantage to shrink. 
Thus, the information available to the voters may 
have been crucial in deciding the Michigan vote. A 
direct causality between the particular constitution of 
the information made available to Michigan voters and 
the result cannot be established. But it is not 
unreasonable to assume that the available information 
would be at least a part of the equation.  
Looking at the state of Michigan in the 2016 U.S. 
presidential election, Kominska et al. [27] found that 
misleading “junk news” was being shared as often as 
“professional” news, both making up approximately 
33% of the total content shared in the days leading up 
to the election.  In other words, even if you ignore the 
existence of filter bubbles and echo chambers [28] and 
assume that every voter is equally exposed to the 
different sources of information, every other piece of 
election-related news given to the voters in Michigan 
through social media, would be false. The Michigan 
voters who primarily got their news from social media, 
would literally only get half the story. The other half of 
the story was an attempt to sway them in a particular 
direction. 
This is a clear violation of Rawls’ rule on the 
transparency of democratic mechanisms and the 
citizens’ ability to obtain the necessary information to 
express themselves in a democratic system. By 
ensuring that half of the information made available to 
voters is in fact misinformation, citizens’ ability to 
express themselves this way is clearly impeded.  
Now, most voters do not get all their information 
from social media, just a substantial part of it [29]. 
Also, as mentioned above, voters can freely choose not 
to engage in social media without disengaging from 
society. However, even if voters choose to do so, the 
spillover effect from social media into other types of 
news media as well as interpersonal communication is 
enough, I argue, to still have a powerful impact on the 
general information consumption of voters. This can be 
seen in studies of how so-called “fake news” stories 
were picked up by traditional media after first having 
appeared on social media [30],[31]. 
In other words, whether or not the individual is 
actively engaging with social media or not, is 
somewhat irrelevant. The impact on the generally 
available information pool happens regardless, and so a 
citizen who is not on social media, would still – to 
some extent – use social media-borne information to 
make a voting decision. Therefore, it is essential to 
understand how social media persuasion happens, and 
related to this paper, and which part psychometrics 
play. 
 
3.2. When psychometrics entered political 
social media campaigning. 
 
In 2015, Youyou, Kosinski and Stillwell published 
a paper to much attention that showed how software 
was able to predict personality traits more effectively 
than humans, at least within the confines set by the 
paper [32]. Using only users’ Facebook Likes as the 
main source of data, computers running predictive 
analytics software were able to place users more 
accurately within the so-called Big Five model than the 
users’ Facebook friends could. The Big Five or Five-
Factor psychometrics model measures the prevalence 
of five personality traits that spell OCEAN: Openness 
to experience, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, 
Agreeableness and Neuroticism [33]. 86,220 
participants would fill out a 100-item questionnaire 
that was used to score the different traits, and this self-
evaluation was then compared to Big Five scores 
provided by Facebook friends with varying relations to 
the participants as well as the above-mentioned 
software basing its evaluation on Likes. 
The computer-based evaluations had an average 
accuracy of 0.56 compared to an average accuracy of 
0.49 in the human evaluation. This caught the attention 
of the media, but also of Alexandr Kogan, an assistant 
professor from the same psychology department at 
Cambridge where the above study was performed. 
Kogan had started a consulting company and wanted to 
license the model used in the study, but was turned 
down. However, based on his knowledge of the model, 
Kogan then provided a similar model to Strategic 
Communications Laboratories (SCL), a company that 
uses psychological modeling to influence voter groups. 
In 2013, Cambridge Analytica was formed as a 
subsidiary of SCL meant to specifically work on U.S. 
elections. They were hired by the 2016 campaigns of 
Ted Cruz and Donald Trump, and have also been 
connected to the Leave campaign in the UK “Brexit” 
referendum [4]. 
Beirle et al. [34] point to the widespread belief that 
Cambridge Analytica and their version of the model 
that originated with Youyou, Kosinski and Stillwell, 
played a significant, if not essential part in the election 
of Donald Trump – something that Cambridge 
Analytica have also claimed themselves. 
 
3.3. Psychometrics, social media and 
democracy 
 
Don Fallis [35] points to the necessity of equal 
access to information in fair society. All three argue 
that Rawls’ veil of ignorance entails equal access to 
information, as it would be impossible for those 
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constructing a fair society to do so without information 
about the stakes. The whole point of the veil of 
ignorance, in these authors’ view, is to make decisions 
without any preconceptions or prior knowledge, but 
with the stakeholders possessing a similar level of 
information. Van den Hoven and Rooksby [36] argue 
specifically that access to information is a candidate to 
be one of Rawls’ primary goods, i.e. something that 
everyone has a right to obtain in a fair and just society, 
and which is essential to the individual’s performance 
of citizenship.  
But Rawls is in fact even more specific in his 
assertion that in order to assert their political liberties 
and make use of their primary goods in the democratic 
process, there is a need for ”assurance of a more even 
access to public media” [26 pp. 149]. Rawls sees it as 
imperative that there is equal access to the educational 
resources necessary to make informed decisions in the 
deliberative process he calls “Public Reason” [37, pp. 
216].  
 
4. Violations 
 
Here, we hit upon the first of the two ways in which 
use of psychometrics in political campaigning on social 
media violate Rawlsian ethics.  
It is tempting to believe that there are almost no 
limits on spaces to store or relay information on the 
Internet. Even if you assume that to be the case, the 
emergence of the ‘attention economy’ [38],[39],[40] 
showed that there is clearly a limit to how much users 
of online services can consume of the information 
presented to them online. The persuasion game in 
online media is thus a zero-sum game. For persuaders 
in the online sphere, part of the mission is to succeed in 
presenting their information in a way that blocks out 
competing information that may invalidate the 
persuaders’ viewpoints. This is exactly what targeted 
political campaigning excels in, and in particular the 
campaigns that use psychometrics. As mentioned 
above, machine learning-based psychometric targeting 
has been shown to target the individual better than 
humans, thus creating a situation where tailor-made 
information is relayed at the individual level on social 
media.  
Now consider the situation as seen in Michigan, 
where just as much misinformation was presented to 
the individual as information. Taking a cue from 
Luciano Floridi [41], and assuming that untruthful 
information is in fact not information at all, but 
misinformation, this means that the individual targeted 
by psychometric-based campaigning is deprived of the 
full and free access to factual information required to 
participate in the democratic process as Rawls 
understands it, at least insofar the individual uses social 
media to access such information. Of course, in Rawls’ 
ideal scenario, a more even access to public media 
would counterbalance this, and a citizen would always 
be able to draw information from public media instead 
of commercial, social media. However, it is clear that 
more people now retrieve news and other information 
used in the democratic process from social media than 
public media, at least in the U.S. [29]. So is it not just a 
question of educating the public to not trust social 
media for this kind of information?  
 
4.1. Expectations of transparency 
 
I argue that it is not, in light of the expectations of 
users when accessing this type of information on social 
media. Using once again the example of Facebook, the 
company and its representatives have stated several 
times that they wish for the platform to be an objective 
and transparent venue for debate in which all sides can 
be equally represented in a pluralist vision not unlike 
Rawls’ [21],[26],[37]. There has been much critique of 
the assumed objectivity and transparency of social 
media platforms [2],[14],[15],[22] but for the sake of 
the argument, I will go forward with the assumption 
that the social media platforms in question have pure 
intentions in this regard and are at least working 
towards such a vision.  
Facebook’s terms and conditions for advertisers 
[44] as well as their community guidelines [43] are 
quite clear. Advertisers cannot make statements that 
are factually incorrect or is intended to mislead the 
public. This is also applicable to advertising in the 
shape of sponsored posts to users’ news feeds. Those 
using psychometrics to target users with 
misinformation or ‘fake news’ are thus in violation of 
Facebook’s rules. However, much of this 
misinformation is also spread through sock puppet 
(fake) accounts, enabling a peer-to-peer virality. This is 
also in violation of Facebook’s rules, this time the 
terms and conditions for users [42] as well as the 
community guidelines. 
I am not attempting to state the obvious here, that 
sources of fake news and misinformation on Facebook 
are in violation of Facebook’s own rules. But I argue 
that users cannot be blamed for expecting those rules to 
be followed by others and enforced by Facebook so 
that breaking them have consequences. Whether 
Facebook actually does this is a matter for another 
paper. 
  
4.2. Hijacking users’ information sources to 
transmit misinformation 
 
If users have a reasonable expectation that 
Facebook’s own vision of transparency and pluralism 
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is foundational to the platform, and the rules are there 
to inhibit the spread of misinformation, the burden is – 
initially, at least - not on the users to separate 
misinformation from information. A pragmatic 
solution to the current problem maybe such a higher 
level of media and information literacy, but from the 
standpoint of Rawlsian basic principles for a well-
ordered, just and fair society, hijacking (as in 
Michigan) half of the information available and instead 
presenting misinformation blocks citizens’ abilities to 
express themselves as citizens. 
The role of psychometrics here is the hijacking 
part. It is important here to note that not all 
misinformation, fake news or junk news being spread 
in Michigan came from the Trump campaign. 
However, according to both Anderson and Horvath 
[50] and Grusin [51], some of it did, and was 
distributed to users through micro-segmentation 
methods employing psychometrics. Psychometrics are 
unique in this manner, since they enable targeting so 
precise that it is possible for misinformation to crowd 
out information presented to the user. This is less 
problematic with commercial advertising, as the user 
freely accepts this as part of the contract when 
engaging with a social media platform. But the user 
has no expectation of political campaigning using 
psychometrics, and is not free to disengage from the 
effect of social media campaigning, as it impacts the 
entire societal debate in which Rawlsian public 
reasoning should be taking place.  
Again, the user is free to leave social media or 
ignore advertising, but to be a moral citizen who 
participates in the democratic process, as Rawls 
prescribes, the user must be open to an array of 
viewpoints [26],[37] and therefore cannot simply tune 
out.  
  
4.3. Uneven information access by 
definition 
 
Could psychometrics-based political campaigning 
on social media be used in ways that benefit the 
citizen’s ability to participate in the manner Rawls 
considers to be that person’s duty? I argue that it 
cannot, and this brings me to the second way that this 
sort of use of psychometrics is in violation of Rawlsian 
principles.  
As mentioned above, Rawls considers it imperative 
to the free expression of a citizen’s political liberty that 
there is an even access to public media. The word 
“even” is important here, as it relates to the equities 
that dominate Rawls’ work. The purpose of 
psychometrics in political campaigning on social 
media is to tailor the message as much as possible to 
the individual user. This is, at its very foundation, a 
principle of inequity and asymmetry.  
One of the few areas in which Rawls agrees with 
his contemporaries Habermas and Foucault [45], is that 
there can be imbalances in communication between 
sender and receiver and that these imbalances can be 
expressed in power relations. At for least Rawls and 
Habermas, this touches upon the ethicality of 
democratic discourse itself, with Rawls arguing that 
citizens must enter freely and equally into the public 
reasoning [37] and Habermas arguing that any sort of 
discourse in the public sphere must be held to certain 
norms of truthfulness and fairness for it to benefit 
democracy [46]. 
Use of psychometrics in political social media 
campaigns runs counter to this. Not only does the 
extreme precision and individual-level addressing of 
the user have the ability to crowd out other viewpoints 
and reduce the amount of pluralism in the discourse as 
mentioned above. It also automatically creates a power 
asymmetry that would not be acceptable under Rawls’ 
and Habermas’ doctrines of democratic discourse 
mentioned above. They both argue for equity in the 
discourse, but if a user only sees one aspect of one 
viewpoint, while another user sees another, singular 
aspect of that same viewpoint because of this type of 
ultra-precise targeting, this equity does not exist, as 
one user may not have access to the same information 
given to the other.  
Even if one viewed the citizen’s attention as a 
battleground to be fought over through hypertargeting, 
lack of access to the amounts of data required to 
produce reliable psychometrics would be a barrier for 
grassroots organizations or smaller players in the 
political landscape that are essential to the pluralism 
advocated for by Rawls. This structure would be very 
much contingent on previously established positions of 
power, which runs contrary to how Rawls argues a fair 
and just society is built. 
In other words, this is problematic even when the 
communication does not involve misinformation. It is 
merely a principle of inequity at the heart of hyper-
targeted political communication, of which 
psychometrics is the instrument du jour.  
Once again, the use of psychometrics in 
commercial advertising is different from political 
campaigning: It may be important to you but from 
socio-ethical standpoint, it does not matter if you see 
all the bike advertisements targeted towards you before 
you purchase a bike. However, in the Rawlsian 
framework, a well-ordered, democratic society requires 
its citizens to have access to all the viewpoints they 
have to choose between, and filtering out some for the 
purpose of effectiveness of messaging is thus 
unethical. 
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 5. Conclusion 
 
There are many other ethical aspects of the use of 
psychometrics in targeted advertising on social media 
not discussed here. One example is the fact that 
psychometric methods such as the ‘Big Five’ method 
mentioned above can be viewed as partial 
psychoanalysis or part of a larger psychological, 
diagnostic process. That takes the discussion in the 
ethics of involuntary psychological assessment, which 
is something the mental health field has grappled with 
for a long time [47],[48],[49]. Closer to the 
communication, media and information studies fields, 
it can also be debated whether psychometrics should be 
used in any sort of communication tactic, particularly 
with the emergence of location- and identity aware 
media platforms in public spaces. Is it okay for the 
billboard that sees you coming to address your needs 
on a very individualized level, based on who your 
psychometrics say you are? What happens when 
psychometric measurement in advertising and 
persuasion reveals something about that you don’t 
know yourself yet? Another discussion is the long-
running debate over social profiles which reaches back 
before psychometrics entered the picture, and which 
raises questions about the consequences of defining a 
person by what can almost certainly only be part of a 
larger picture, even with the best psychometrics in 
place.  
These, and many other discussions will likely flare 
up in the future as psychometrics and other means of 
hypertargeting take up larger and larger roles in our 
daily lives. In this article, I have focused on the 
practice of using psychometrics for political 
persuasion, using social media to both collect data 
about, but also directly reach individual citizens. I have 
argued how, in a Rawlsian perspective, using 
psychometrics in this manner may lead to at least two 
different situations in which the access to information 
required to fulfill a citizen’s democratic duties is 
impeded and/or unequal. A plausible future exploration 
of the matter would entail exploring other ethical 
schools of thought than that of Rawls’, such as a 
utilitarian or libertarian view of the matter. 
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